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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1997, Stanford University and the California Youth Authority [hereinafter
“CYA”] conducted a biomedical research experiment on sixty-one male inmates
from ages fourteen to eighteen.1 All of the subjects were given a drug named
Depakote, used primarily for treating seizures and mania.2 The drug was tested to see
if it would reduce the amount of aggressiveness in juvenile inmates.3 The possible
side effects to such a drug include “drowsiness, nausea, indigestion and vomiting . . .
hair loss, anxiety, depression, and a decrease in white blood cells.”4 These particular
juveniles were selected as a target population because they had been convicted of
violent crimes.5 While Stanford attempted to obtain consent from parents of the
juvenile inmates, not all parents responded.6 Where parents did not respond or could
not be found, the CYA consented for the juveniles.7 This experiment presents
various issues in biomedical and behavioral research on human subjects in
vulnerable populations. The Stanford study led to such serious concerns, that the
Governor of California asked the attorney general and inspector general to
investigate the study’s “legal implications.”8
1

Tracy Weber, 1997 Drug Test on Teenage Inmates Probed, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1999, at

A1.
2

Id.

3
Neela Dasgupta, Stanford Study on Prisoners Investigated, STAN. DAILY, Aug. 19, 1999,
available
at
<http://daily.stanford.org/daily98%2D99/8%2D19Y.2D1999/news/
newpsych19.html>.
4

Weber, supra note 1.

5

Id.

6

Dasgupta, supra note 3.

7

Id.

8

Id.
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The most important issue presented by the Stanford study is whether children
who are incarcerated can give voluntary, informed consent to such experiments.9
Federal regulations govern biomedical and behavioral research on human subjects.10
These regulations give separate additional protections to both children and
prisoners.11 However, there are no regulations specifically covering the area of
biomedical and behavioral research on juvenile prisoners or inmates. This is an
especially vulnerable class of individuals to target for conducting biomedical and
behavioral research. Voluntary informed consent is an essential element to any type
of research, and when dealing with juvenile inmates as subjects, that consent is more
difficult to obtain. Yet biomedical and behavioral research is still conducted on this
population, as evidenced by the 1997 Stanford University study.12
The question that will be addressed here is whether juvenile inmates can
voluntarily give informed consent to participate in biomedical and behavioral
research. Further, can juvenile inmates act voluntarily in the midst of coercion used
by researchers to persuade the subjects to participate, and coercion that is inherent in
the nature of being a juvenile inmate? Can consent be informed when a juvenile
inmate’s comprehension and understanding of what biomedical and behavioral
research entails is limited by age and maturity level? Finally, even if juvenile
inmates are deemed capable to give voluntary informed consent to biomedical and
behavioral research, is simply participating in such research violative of their
constitutional rights?
This note begins briefly by defining biomedical and behavioral research
according to the federal regulations. Then, the development and history behind the
federal regulations is highlighted to show the origin of the current form of the
regulations. This development includes an examination of the current form of the
regulations, which illustrates the general provisions and their application to
biomedical and behavioral research on human subjects. This section on the general
provisions covers what is termed an Institutional Review Board [hereinafter “IRB”],
informed consent standards, and possible sanctions for noncompliance.
Following the section on general provisions is an analysis of two specific
provisions that add protections for vulnerable classes of persons as research subjects.
These two additional protections are for children and prisoners. Before there can be
an investigation into research on juvenile inmates, there must first be a description of
the additional protections provided for children and prisoners. The provision that
relates to children is examined first, and covers definitions, minimal risk standards,
and parental consent attached to informed consent standards. Following the section
on children is the section on adult prisoners, which covers definitions, additional
provisions for IRBs, and avoidance of coercion.
Finally, there will be an analysis of biomedical and behavioral research on
juvenile inmates and the specific problems that are entailed. This section covers
reasons why this is a particularly vulnerable population to research, with problems of
informed consent and coerced choices. There is also an examination of the juvenile
9

Weber, supra note 1.

10

See generally 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (1999).

11

See generally §§ 46.301, 46.401.

12

Weber, supra note 1.
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inmates’ constitutional rights when participating in research. Then the two
additional provisions on children and prisoners are combined to see how they may
apply to juvenile inmates. This section will conclude with the various troubles
created by the regulations when applied to juvenile inmates.
II. WHAT IS BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH?
Biomedical and behavioral research involves many types of research. Research,
for purposes of the federal regulations, is broadly defined by 45 C.F.R. § 46.102 as
“a systematic investigation, including research development, testing and evaluation,
designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge.”13 Research may also
be classified as a clinical investigation.14 A clinical investigation is defined by 21
C.F.R. § 50.3 as “any experiment that involves a test article and one or more human
subjects and . . . is subject to . . . the Food and Drug Administration.”15 The
definitions of research and clinical investigation, when combined, subject almost
every type of research to the authority of the federal regulations.16
Biomedical and behavioral research is conducted for many purposes. An
argument could be made that such research is too necessary for any sort of
regulation. Human experimentation has had many successes that are widely
recognized.17 It has enabled scientists to further “medical understanding” and
“unlock knowledge that may profoundly change the nature of our existence.”18
Despite these accomplishments, various arguments have been made against the
use of human subjects for biomedical and behavioral research. These arguments
directly conflict with the goals and objectives of the researchers conducting the
experiments. Researchers argue that research or human experimentation is useful, or
for the “common good.”19 There is a difference between the interests promoted by
research (the researcher’s motivations) and interests that are at stake due to the
research (the interests of the human subject). The researcher is interested in
discovery, accomplishment and recognition. By contrast, the human subject is
interested in rewards for participating, taking part in improving medicine, and
13
45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (1999) (“Activities which meet this definition constitute research
for purposes of this policy, whether or not they are conducted or supported under a program
which is considered research for other purposes.”).
14

21 C.F.R. § 50.3(c) (1999).

15

Id.

16

Dale L. Moore, Recurrent Issues in the Review of Medical Research on Human Subjects,
1 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, at 4 (1991) (“Indeed, even a relatively mundane endeavor, such as
a study of nurses’ attitudes toward hospital patients who happen to be physicians, is research if
it is designed to collect data that will contribute to generalizable knowledge.”).
17
Kevin M. King, A Proposal For The Effective International Regulation of Biomedical
Research Involving Human Subjects, 34 STAN. J. INT’L L. 163, 166 (1998).
18
Id. (stating that biomedical and behavioral research has also awarded us with the
“eradication of smallpox and polio”).
19

Richard W. Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Human Experimentation and the Ethics of
Autonomy, 36 CATH. LAW. 455, 467 (1996). See generally DONALD EVANS & MARTYN
EVANS, A DECENT PROPOSAL, ETHICAL REVIEW OF CLINICAL RESEARCH (1996); ETHICAL
ISSUES IN RESEARCH (Darwin Cheney, ed., 1993).
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avoiding physical harm or pain and suffering. Whose interests are being looked out
for in research where human subjects undergo pain and suffering in exchange for
biomedical advances in medicine?
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL REGULATIONS
There is a long history of biomedical and behavioral research conducted on
human subjects worldwide. However, only in the twentieth century has concern
developed over the abuse of research on human subjects.20 In 1932, Japan began to
experiment on thousands of people in China, including American prisoners of war, to
test germ warfare.21 Also, in 1946, several Nazi German officials were tried in
Nuremberg, Germany for conducting “medical experiments on men, women, and
children in concentration camps.”22 From 1932 to 1972, over 400 black men were
exposed to syphilis in an experiment, referred to as the Tuskegee Syphilis
Experiment, sponsored by the U.S. Public Health Service.23 Following these
twentieth century abuses of experimentation, there arose a demand for regulation of
experimentation involving human subjects. The federal regulations were created in
1974 and have been amended several times since.24
The federal regulations that have been adopted come from the Food and Drug
Administration [hereinafter “FDA”] and the Department of Health and Human
Services [hereinafter “DHHS”], titles 21 and 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
respectively.25 Many other departments and agencies that experiment or conduct
research on human subjects have adopted these regulations as the “Common Rule.”26
Some state laws have even begun to model the federal regulations. From 1975 to
1990, the New York State Department of Mental Hygiene has issued regulations that
match those of the federal regulations.27 These federal regulations are, themselves, a
model of a body of law, the Nuremberg Code.

20

Garnett, supra note 19, at 465.

21

Jonathan D. Moreno, Lessons Learned: A Half-Century of Experimenting on Humans, 59
HUMANIST 9 (1999) available at 1999 WL 3645408 (pagination unavailable). See also
Garnett, supra note 19, at 464.
22

Moreno, supra note 21.

23

Id. See generally JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD, THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT
(1981).
24
Richard Delgado & Helen Leskovac, Informed Consent in Human Experimentation:
Bridging the Gap Between Ethical Thought and Current Practice, 34 UCLA L. REV. 67, 71
(1986).
25

Id.

26

Tom Puglisi, Congressional Testimony on Suspension of Medical Research, Federal
Document Clearing House, Inc. (April 21, 1999), available at 1999 WL 16946495.
27
John M. Oldham, et al., Symposium: “Conducting Medical Research on the Decisionally
Impaired” Regulating Research With Vulnerable Populations: Litigation Gone Awry, 1 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 154, 156-60 (1998).
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The FDA and the DHHS have borrowed some of the main principles of the
Nuremberg Code, and have included them in the federal regulations.28 The
Nuremberg Code is the “first known attempt to establish international legal
guidelines for regulating research on humans.”29 The general principle emphasized
by the Code was that the importance of research and the gathering of scientific
knowledge could not outweigh the individual rights of subjects.30 The most
important idea borrowed from the Nuremberg Code is that “voluntary consent of the
human subject is absolutely essential.”31 In addition to the FDA and the DHHS
regulations, the Nuremberg Code is binding upon researchers in the United States.32
The federal regulations have the force of law and are binding on all researchers.33
Title 21, part 50 only applies to clinical investigations regulated by the FDA, as
defined above.34 Title 45, part 46 covers “all research involving human subjects
conducted, supported or otherwise subject to regulation by any federal department or
agency….”35 This coverage, however, is limited only to federally funded or
supported research.36 There are also certain situations in which the regulations will
not apply at all.37 The majority of these exempted types of research deal with
research held in educational settings or involving cognitive tests.38 Furthermore,
“department or agency heads may waive the applicability of some or all of the
provisions” set forth in these regulations for research activities, as they deem
necessary.39 Thus, it is questionable as to how much coverage the regulations
actually have over biomedical and behavioral research.
28
Samuel Jan Brakel, Considering Behavioral and Biomedical Research on Detainees in
the Mental Health Unit of an Urban Mega-Jail, 22 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 1, 6 (1996).
29

King, supra note 17, at 168.

30

Moreno, supra note 21.

31

The Nuremberg Code, reprinted in THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN
SUBJECTS: FACING THE 21ST CENTURY 431-32 (Harold Y. Vanderpool, ed., 1996).
32

In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation, 874 F. Supp. 796, 821 (S.D. Ohio 1995).

33

See generally 42 U.S.C. § 289(a) (1999) (“[t]he secretary shall by regulation require” an
Institutional Review Board “to review biomedical and behavioral research involving human
subjects”).
34

21 C.F.R. § 50.1(a) (1999).

35

45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (1999).

36

Robert J. Katerberg, Note, Institutional Review Boards, Research on Children, and
Informed Consent of Parents: Walking the Tightrope Between Encouraging Vital
Experimentation and Protecting Subjects’ Rights, 24 J.C. & U.L. 545, 549 (1998).
37

45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b) (1999).

38
Id. (exempting these types of research: (i) research conducted in commonly accepted
educational settings, (ii) research involving the use of educational tests, (iii) research involving
publicly available documents and records of existing data, (iv) research which is meant to
examine public benefit or service programs, and (v) research involving taste and food quality
evaluation).
39

45 C.F.R. § 46.101(i) (1999).
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Title 42, section 289 of the United States Code requires that there be a regulation
in force which in turn will require an IRB for the purpose of reviewing “biomedical
and behavioral research involving human subjects.”40 The IRB has the “authority to
approve, require modifications in, or disapprove all research activities” covered by
the regulations.41 The IRB fulfills its duties by: (i) ensuring that risks to subjects are
minimal, (ii) reviewing informed consent documents and the procedures used to
obtain consent, (iii) reviewing the selection of subjects, (iv) balancing the risks with
the benefits derived from the research, and (v) providing that the subjects’ privacy is
protected.42 If all of these criteria are satisfied then the research is approved by the
IRB. The IRB must also meet member requirements, according to 45 C.F.R. § 46.
Every IRB must have five members who are diversified by gender and race.43 One
member must be a person with scientific concerns, another must have concerns in a
nonscientific area, and there must be at least one member who is not affiliated with
the institution conducting the research.44
There are three main interests that an IRB must consider when deciding whether
to approve a specific research experiment.45 They are the interests of: (1) the
researchers or investigators, (2) the institution supporting the research, and (3) the
research subjects.46 As to the latter, “the subject’s own health and well-being, which
are directly and foreseeably affected by the research, make the subject the most
vulnerable of the three parties.”47 In all, the IRB has the challenge of taking all three
interests into consideration and balancing them so that the private rights involved are
never underestimated.
As stated, the FDA and DHHS have borrowed from the Nuremberg Code the
idea that voluntary informed consent is necessary for research.48 Informed consent
must be “documented by the use of a written consent form approved by the IRB and
signed by the subject.”49 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a) provides researchers with eight
general requirements to satisfy voluntary informed consent.50 Those requirements are
as follows:
(1) A statement of what the research involves, and information on its
duration, procedures, and purposes;

40
42 U.S.C. § 289(a) (1999) (stating that statute is also for the purpose of protecting the
rights of human subjects).
41

45 C.F.R. § 46.109(a) (1999).

42

§ 46.111. See also Moore, supra note 16, at 8-9.

43

45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a)-(f).

44

Id. (requiring that no member may serve on the IRB if he/she has a conflict of interest).

45

Moore, supra note 16, at 12-13.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

See 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (1999); 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1999).

49

45 C.F.R. § 46.117(a) (1999).

50

§ 46.116. See also Puglisi, supra note 26; Delgado, supra note 24.
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(2) A statement of “any reasonably foreseeable risks” to the subject;
(3) A statement of “any benefits to the subject or to others”;
(4) A disclosure of alternative procedures if available;
(5) A statement explaining “confidentiality of records”;
(6) When “more than a minimal risk” is involved, a statement explaining
any compensation or medical treatment that would be available if
injury were to occur;
(7) A statement of whom to contact for any questions the research subject
might have;
(8) A statement informing subjects “that participation is voluntary” and
“they may discontinue participation at any time without penalty or
loss of benefits.”51
Both the FDA and the DHHS prohibit the use of exculpatory clauses in obtaining
informed consent.52 These provisions specifically prohibit “any language through
which the subject . . . is made to waive or appear to waive any of the subject’s legal
rights, or releases or appears to release the investigator, the sponsor, the institution or
its agents from liability for negligence.”53
The federal regulations reach some but not all biomedical and behavioral
research, and provide for sanctions when they are not followed. There are only two
sections within the regulations that provide for remedies or penalties for violations of
the regulations. 45 C.F.R. § 46.113 provides that an IRB may suspend or terminate
research that is not “conducted in accordance with the IRB’s requirements.”54 The
other, 45 C.F.R. § 46.123, provides that a “department or agency head” may
terminate any funding or support provided by that specific agency or department for
failure to comply with the regulations.55
There are a number of deficiencies in these regulations and the requirements for
informed consent.56 The DHHS provides the IRB with great discretion for granting

51
Id.; see also § 46.116(b) (delineating other elements of information that may be required
to be included with informed consent: (i) a statement that the treatment will invoke risks
which are currently unforeseeable, (ii) anticipated circumstances by which the experiment may
be terminated, (iii) additional costs to the subject, (iv) consequences of a subject’s decision to
withdraw from the procedures, (v) statement of any additional findings during the research
experiment, and (vi) the number of other subjects involved in the research project).
52

See 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (1999); 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1999).

53

21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (1999); 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1999).

54

45 C.F.R. § 46.113 (1999).

55

§ 46.123.

56

Delgado, supra note 24, at 75-76.
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broad waivers to the requirement of informed consent.57 The requirement to obtain
informed consent may be waived when the “research could not practicably be carried
out without the waiver or alteration.”58 The IRB may also waive the requirements for
informed consent when “the research involves no more than minimal risk to the
subjects,” “the waiver . . . will not adversely affect the rights and welfare of the
subjects,” and “when the subjects will be provided with additional pertinent
information after participation.”59 This leaves the IRB with many ways to approve
the research without requiring informed consent.
In addition to the above general regulations, the DHHS has recognized the need
to provide additional protections for human subjects belonging to a vulnerable class
of people.60 Vulnerable classes of subjects can include children, prisoners, pregnant
women, and handicapped or mentally disabled persons.61 The classes of children and
prisoners are the focus here.
IV. BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH ON CHILDREN
The regulations define “children” as “persons who have not attained the legal age
for consent to treatments or procedures involved in the research, under the applicable
law of the jurisdiction in which the research will be conducted.”62 This definition
leaves to the states the discretion to apply their own “legal age for consent”
according to state laws. The result is that the additional protections for children
contained in the federal regulations do not apply to certain children due to the state
laws that set the age of legal consent at a young age.63
From a researcher’s perspective, a test population of children is an ideal group to
target for research. Some argue that research or experimentation on children is
necessary, because the problems and illnesses studied in children are specific to
children.64 Examples of problems studied in children that are age specific are
childhood autism and suicidal adolescent depression.65 Genetic research on children
is also a benefit since it allows researchers to identify genetic diseases and early
development in humans.66 Inherent in genetic research is the process of determining
the genetic traits children develop as they mature.67

57

45 C.F.R. § 46.116(c)-(d) (1999).

58

§ 46.116(c)(2); 46.116(d)(3).

59

§ 46.116(d)(1); 46.116(d)(2); 46.116(d)(4).

60

§ 46.107(a).

61

Id.

62

§ 46.402(a).

63

Katerberg, supra note 36, at 558.

64

Garnett, supra note 19, at 484.

65

Oldham, supra note 27, at 171.

66

Allen J. Wilcox, et al., Genetic Determinism and the Overprotection of Human Subjects,
21 NATURE GENETICS 362 (1999).
67

Id.
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Subpart D of title 45, part 46 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides the
protections for children, as subjects of research, that are in addition to the general
regulations on all research involving human subjects.68 The regulations specific to
children are based on the concept of “minimal risk.”69 “Minimal risk” is defined by
45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) as when “the probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort
anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily
encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical or
psychological examinations or tests.”70 The major problem with the standard is that it
likens ordinary, daily activities in a child’s life with the activities that are conducted
under research.71 One example of the defect of this standard applies where children
who are chronically ill receive ongoing treatments for their medical condition. These
children are probed and exposed to different types of medicine with side effects, on a
“daily” and “routine” basis, to treat their medical condition.72 Under this minimal
risk standard, researchers will be able to probe or expose these children to
experimental drugs with the same or similar side effects as those which are used in
the children’s medical treatment. The reason for this is that the research will not
pose a higher risk than what these children are already experiencing.73 The standard
of minimal risk, which is the basis of the additional protections for children, is
unworkable with such defects.
The DHHS divides the research to be approved by IRBs into three main
categories:
(1) Where no greater than minimal risk to children is presented;
(2) Where greater than minimal risk to children is presented, as long as a
direct benefit to the individual subjects is also presented;
(3) Where greater than minimal risk to children is presented with no
direct benefit, as long as the research is likely to yield generalizable
knowledge about the subjects’ disorder or condition.74
As to the first category, when research involves no greater than a minimal risk, then
the research will be permitted.75 In the second category, as long as there is an
anticipated benefit to the subjects, the research will be permitted regardless of the

68

45 C.F.R. § 46.401(a) (1999).

69

Katerberg, supra note 36, at 555.

70

45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (1999).

71

Lainie Friedman Ross, Feature, Children as Research Subjects: A Proposal to Revise the
Current Federal Regulations Using a Moral Framework, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 159, 162
(1997) (“[c]hildren commonly encounter experiences at school that threaten their self-image,
but this does not justify similar threats in the research setting.”).
72

Id.

73

Id.

74

See generally 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.404-06 (1999).

75

§ 46.404.
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magnitude of the risk involved.76 The third category extends the researchers’ ability
to research on children by permitting research that will yield at least generalizable
knowledge, even if it does not present an outright benefit to the subjects.77 This last
category is a prime example of how researchers’ interests may be given more weight
than those of the individual subjects.
In addition to these three categories of research involving different levels of risk,
45 C.F.R. § 46.407 goes even further to approve research on children that is not
otherwise approved by the three categories specified.78 Even if the research does not
yield generalizable knowledge specific to the individual subject, as long as the
research “presents responsible opportunity to further the understanding, prevention,
or alleviation of a serious problem affecting the health or welfare of [all] children,”
then the research will be permitted (no risk level is specified).79 Since most research
conducted on children points to this purpose as the end to be achieved, it could be
approved by IRBs on all occasions.80
Another major problem with researching on children that the regulations attempt
to address is whether children can give informed consent.81 45 C.F.R. § 46.408(a)
provides that a child research subject must “assent” to participation in the experiment
whenever the IRB decides on account of age, maturity, and psychological state that
the child subject may give such assent.82 However, assent may be waived as not
necessary by the IRB in two circumstances: (1) where “the capability of some or all
of the children is so limited that they cannot reasonably be consulted,” or (2) where
“the intervention or procedure involved in the research holds out a prospect of direct
benefit that is important to the health or well-being of the children and is available
only in the context of research.”83
In addition to requiring assent from the child subject where appropriate, 45
C.F.R. § 46.408(b) requires that “adequate provisions are made for soliciting the
permission of each child’s parents or guardian.”84 “Parent” is defined by the
regulations as “a child’s biological or adoptive parent.”85 “Guardian” is defined as
“an individual who is authorized under applicable state or local law to consent on
behalf of a child to general medical care.”86 Since states and localities may determine
76

§ 46.405.

77

§ 46.406.

78

§ 46.407.

79

§ 46.407(a).

80

See Garnett, supra note 19, at 484; Oldham, supra note 27, at 171.

81

Delgado, supra note 24, at 94.

82

45 C.F.R. § 46.408(a) (1999). See also § 46.402(b) (“’Assent’ means a child’s
affirmative agreement to participate in research.”).
83

§ 46.408(a). See also Ross, supra note 71, at 164 (noting that age seven had been
designated by the National Commission as the age at which a child’s assent is required
because most children over the age of seven have some understanding of the research).
84

45 C.F.R. § 46.408(b) (1999).

85

§ 46.402(d).

86

§ 46.402(e).
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who qualifies as a guardian, the number and type of people who may give permission
for the child to participate is overly broad. State or local laws may permit next of
kin, friends, or even neighbors who know the child well to give consent.
These provisions allow the parent or guardian’s permission to override the child’s
refusal or objection to assent to the research.87 When the child is not required to give
assent according to 45 C.F.R. § 46.408(a) because it is deemed unnecessary, the
parent may still give permission to proceed with the research.88 This seems
detrimental to a child’s personal autonomy.89 Informed consent is the standard used
to justify experimentation on human subjects, because giving consent protects
autonomy.90 It is thus often argued that “proxy consent” is an oxymoron because it
bypasses the principle behind informed consent, which is to recognize selfdetermination and autonomy.91 It could also be argued that a parent’s responsibility
to his or her child is a fiduciary one and, in certain cases, permission to let the child
participate in biomedical and behavioral research may be a breach of that duty.92
The DHHS also provides that the requirement for the parent or guardian’s
permission may be waived in certain circumstances.93 The requirement for parental
permission is waived when the IRB determines that parental or guardian permission
is an unreasonable requirement for the protection of the individual child subject.94
The regulations provide examples where these types of waivers will occur, such as
when the parents are neglectful or abusive to the children.95 Also, whenever the
general waivers to the requirement of informed consent occur due to the exemption
provisions in 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b), viz., cognitive tests in educational settings,
public benefit and service programs, etc., there is no need to acquire either the
parent’s or guardian’s permission or the child’s assent to research.96
Furthermore, informed consent may be given without parental permission if the
minor is emancipated.97 Emancipated minors are those “adolescents who are entitled
to give legal consent because of their status,” which includes being a “mature minor”
according to state law, married or parenting adolescents, and college students living
away from home.98 A “mature minor” is a person of juvenile age, but who exhibits

87

Ross, supra note 71, at 167.

88

45 C.F.R. § 46.408(a) (1999).

89

Garnett, supra note 19, at 486.

90

Id.

91
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an understanding of the research and its procedures.99 Some states specify that a
child is a mature minor by age; others take into account the child’s level of
comprehension of the risks and benefits as a deciding factor.100 Also, there is an
argument known as the “babysitter test,” which incorporates the idea that a babysitter
(a child who is mature enough to supervise younger children) should also be held as
mature enough to give informed legal consent to participation in research.101
V. BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH ON ADULT PRISONERS
The DHHS defines “prisoner” as “any individual involuntarily confined or
detained in a penal institution.”102 This broad definition covers individuals sentenced
under both criminal and civil statutes.103 Prisoners have been targeted as research
populations in the United States extensively since the end of World War II.104 The
United States was actually the only Western nation continuing to conduct biomedical
and behavioral research on prisoners after the Nuremberg Trials.105 Prisoner research
has decreased substantially over the years, but it still remains in certain locations
across the United States.106
Researchers continue to target prisoners as a research population due to the
various benefits that result to the researchers and institutions that conduct the
experiments. It has been argued by many that prisons are an almost ideal location
for conducting research because they consist of routine life subject to few
variations.107 That is, prison life is already controlled for the researcher. Prisoners
eat the same food, sleep at the same times, and partake in the same types of
activities. Researchers also argue that it is less burdensome on prisoners to be
subject to any sort of research compared to those who are not incarcerated.108
Another reason why conducting research on prisoners is so desirable is that
researchers can pay less money to carry out experiments since prisoners can be paid
substantially less than other subjects who are not incarcerated.109
Additional protections are placed on research on prisoners by Subpart C of title
45, part 46 of the Code of Federal Regulations.110 The purpose of these protections is
“to provide additional safeguards for the protection of prisoners involved in”
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biomedical and behavioral research.111 One important aspect of these additional
protections is that they give prisoners the chance to have representation on the
IRB.112 The regulations specific to prisoner subjects require that at least one member
of the Board is a prisoner or a prisoner representative with the background and
experience needed to adequately represent such prisoners.113 This representation is
meant to give prisoners a voice for expressing their rights when decisions are made
by the IRB.
The IRB is also charged with other duties and determinations specific to research
on prisoners.114 The IRB must determine that the following conditions are met before
approving any research sought to target prisoners as subjects:
The research is permissible under the regulations specifically relating to
prisoners under 45 C.F.R. § 46.306(a)(2);
The advantages of participation in the research are not of such a
magnitude that a prisoner’s ability to weigh the risks of the research
against the value of such advantages is impaired;
The risks involved are equal to the risks that would be involved for
persons not incarcerated;115
All prisoner subjects are chosen equally and randomly;
The information presented to the prisoners is clear and understandable;
Prisoners are informed that their participation in the research will not have
an effect on their parole;
There is a follow-up examination when necessary for the care of
participants after the research experiment has ended.116
These seven considerations, that are to be determined by the IRB, are important for
deciding whether the research is equitable and whether the prisoners are acting
voluntarily in participating.117 The type of research conducted must fall within one of
the four types of research permitted under § 46.306(a)(2).118 The IRB then approves
the research by finding that it qualifies for each of the seven considerations listed
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above.119 Under section 46.306(a)(2), the first two types of research permitted use the
same “minimal risk” standard used in the additional protections for children.120 First,
the regulations provide that if the research involves a “study of the possible causes,
effects, and processes of incarceration, and of criminal behavior” and there is “no
more than a minimal risk,” then it will be permitted.121 The second type permits any
research on prisoners that studies “prisons as institutional structures or of prisoners
as incarcerated persons” and that involves “no more than a minimal risk.”122
The last two of the four types of research permitted on prisoners are very broad
and do not involve the concept of “minimal risk.”123 The third type allows the
conducting of research on conditions affecting prisoners as a class of persons,
including research on social and psychological problems among inmates without any
consideration given to “minimal risk” (like category two but without a minimal risk
standard).124 The fourth type permits any “research on practices . . . which have the
intent and reasonable probability of improving the health or well-being of the
subject.”125 It has been argued that these last two types of permitted research allow a
large spectrum of research, especially since the “minimal risk” standard is
disregarded.126
The regulations fail to address adequately the ability of prisoners to give
voluntary informed consent to participation in research. There are two extremes to
the argument of voluntary informed consent by prisoners.127 On the one side, it is
argued that “wholly uncoerced consent is impossible to obtain in the prison
setting.”128 An alternative view is that “there is no such thing as an uncoerced
decision by anyone, in prison or in the free world.”129 This would be like making an
unmotivated decision, which is a human impossibility.130 To analyze these problems
when it comes to prisoners making decisions on whether to participate in research, it
is necessary to look at informed consent, separated from voluntary consent. Even
though the terms “informed consent” and “voluntary consent” are similar, the
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concepts must be looked at separately.131 There can be no informed consent if the
consent given is not also voluntary.132
Turning first to obtaining informed consent of prisoners, recall that the fifth
consideration for the IRB under section 46.305(a) is that information provided to the
prisoners be understandable.133 Consent must be clear and reasonably understood by
the prisoner without any exculpatory clauses added to the consent form.134 Consent
forms are often difficult to read, not just by prisoners but by anyone; forms that are
not understandable by prisoners fail to comply with the regulations.135 It has also
been noted that when high-risk experiments are involved, additional disclosure
should be made beyond that required by the general informed consent requirements
in Subpart A of title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations.136 However, as
previously noted, the only requirement added by the provision is that the prisoners
“understand” the information provided to them about the research and procedures.137
This simple requirement leaves room for error, especially where informed consent is
otherwise waived according to section 46.116 of Subpart A, title 45.138
The voluntary consent problem presents even more complications in the realm of
prisoner research. When it comes to research on prisoner subjects, the driving force
that affects their ability to act voluntarily is coercion. Coercion is often defined as a
constraint or induced influence on the chooser.139 Here, the prisoner choosing to
participate in research. Coercion is a serious deprivation of a person’s rights, with
arguments often directed towards violations of constitutional rights.140 These types of
arguments revolve around the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.141 The Eighth Amendment argument stems from the cruel
and unusual punishment prohibition; it is often used to show that where a prisoner
did not act voluntarily, the prisoner, instead, has undergone cruel and unusual
punishment due to the harmful effects of the experiment.142 The Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments are used to argue that prisoners’ equal protection and due process
rights have been violated. Where prisoners are disadvantaged due to being
incarcerated and any other coercion used by researchers, they have acted
involuntarily and therefore should have been entitled to due process before
131
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undergoing any such research.143 Due process entitles a prisoner the reasonable
opportunity to make a voluntary, uncoerced decision. Prisoners, however, are
deprived of this right from the moment they begin their sentence. Prisoners are
persons who are inherently coerced due to the prison environment and conditions.
The equal protection principle is used to show that when a prisoner participates in
research, that prisoner’s right to be treated equally with respect to “autonomy
accorded other citizens” is violated because the prisoner was coerced.144
There have been very few cases decided that relate to biomedical and behavioral
research on prisoners. Of those, the leading prison research case is Bailey v. Lally in
which a group of former state prisoners who had participated in research medical
tests brought a class action suit in federal court.145 They claimed that conditions of
coercion and inducement had caused them to participate in the research
involuntarily, which violated their constitutional rights to due process and against
cruel and unusual punishment.146 During the time of the experiments, the prison
where these former prisoners were serving their sentences had very poor conditions;
there was no hot water, no heat in the winter, overcrowding (two men to a cell),
excessive noise and sanitation problems.147 For the purpose of the research
experiments a Medical Research Unit [hereinafter “MRU”] was established outside
of the prison.148 The prisoners were offered money as payment for participating in
the research project at a rate higher than they would have been able to get through
the available prison jobs.149
Prisoners were given the chance, if they participated, to leave the conditions of
the prison to go to the MRU. The MRU was adequately heated, quiet, and had hot
water, color television, and three separate bathroom facilities.150 The researchers
“considered a written consent form insufficient and relied on the repetitive oral
explanations to inform the prisoners,” but would at some point later require the
prisoners to read and sign written consent forms.151 The MRU researchers conducted
experiments involving common infectious diseases such as the flu or common
cold.152 None were harmed by or infected with a disease that could not be cured
quickly; the harm that these former prisoners claimed was that they were deprived of
their right to voluntarily choose to participate due to the inherent and extrinsic
coercion placed on them.153
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Neither of the constitutional claims was successful; the court stated that because
the research was not incompatible with “the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society” and because it did not involve “the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain,” the claim of violation of the Eighth Amendment must
fail.154 Because the prisoners were informed that they could withdraw from the
experiment at any point, the court stated that the prisoners could not have been
subject to cruel and unusual punishment.155 As to the Fourteenth Amendment, the
court reasoned that because the acts of the defendants did not “shock the conscience”
of mankind, the plaintiffs were not entitled to due process.156 Since the researchers
continuously informed the prisoners about the experiment and many prisoners were
not attracted to undergo the experiment despite its benefits, the court found that the
prisoners acted both voluntarily and informed.157
There are several causes of coercion in the prison setting, some that qualify as
inherent situational coercion and others that qualify as inducement from the
researcher or institution supporting the research. Monetary compensation paid to
prisoners is one of the most common coercive tools used by researchers.158 Paying
prisoners more money than what they could get otherwise may make participation
seem overwhelmingly attractive and may motivate prisoners to take risks that they
would not normally agree to take.159 However, it is also argued that if pay is so
minimal as to be equal to or less than normal prisoner pay, then prisons will become
the most attractive research setting because of such a low price to pay for conducting
the research.160 Other coercive tools that are often used are:
Separating the prisoners for the experiment, which can provide prisoners
with better housing conditions (i.e. receiving a single cell or being able to
participate in research outside of the institution at a medical hospital as
opposed to living in overcrowded conditions);
The chance to avoid less attractive prison related jobs involving hard labor
and less attractive conditions of the prison setting, such as sanitation,
heating, and water (this is often referred to as “situational coercion”);
and,
The idea that participation will make the prisoner appear to be a better and
improved person when his/her parole is up for review (Even though the
prisoner might think this, recall that one of the IRB’s determinations to be
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made is that there will be no consideration given to the participation in the
research by the prisoner’s parole board).161
All of these, separately or combined, can have the effect of coercing an individual
prisoner to participate in research that he or she would not ordinarily participate.
The DHHS’s additional protections for prisoner subjects do not place much
weight on preventing coercion and use vague rules to try to prevent such coercion.162
However, it is clear that the DHHS had coercion in mind when creating the
additional protections for prisoners; the statement of purpose in 45 C.F.R. § 46.302
recognizes that prisoners are under constraints due to their incarceration that may
affect their ability to voluntarily consent to participation in research.163 Also, recall
that the second determination the IRB must make is that the advantages of
participation in the research are not of such a magnitude that a prisoner’s ability to
weigh the value of each is impaired.164 This consideration is meant to prevent
coercion in the prison setting.
The FDA also does a poor job of addressing coercion used to achieve research
regulated by that agency.165 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 requires only that the “investigator
shall seek [to] . . . minimize the possibility of coercion or undue influence.”166 This
allows a researcher to show that coercion has been minimized where it might have
been great before by only decreasing it by a small increment. This small decrease in
coercive forces would not make a difference in prison settings where coercion is an
inherent force.
VI. BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH ON JUVENILE INMATES
There are many reasons why juvenile inmates are an especially beneficial
population of research subjects to target for conducting biomedical and behavioral
research. The most prominent of those reasons is that the benefits of researching on
children and prisoners are combined. Juvenile inmates for the most part consist of
poor urban males.167 Many of the juveniles who are detained are uneducated and
have a great number of medical problems upon admission to the detention facility,
ranging from sexually transmitted diseases to mental illnesses.168 These diseases give
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researchers an opportunity to research and test possible cures and treatments.
Something else that works to the benefit of researchers is the fact that, when
admitted to the detention facility, most juvenile inmates need medical treatment and
cannot afford to obtain such treatment.169 Juvenile inmates in such a situation will
likely be willing to undergo experimental treatment if they are led to believe it will
help them. Researchers can test their promising drugs and cures on these children
without having to spend money coercing them, and without obtaining “assent”
(consent) to the research since it directly benefits the welfare of the child.170
There are also a number of behavioral problems among juvenile inmates that
might lead researchers to conduct experiments on this group. Behavioral problems,
depression and even learning disabilities are higher in juvenile inmates than other
children.171 Antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, paranoid
disorder, and passive-aggressive disorder are the most common personality disorders
found among juvenile inmates.172 These are heavily researched areas of psychology,
and therefore, juvenile inmates are one of the best sources for that research.
There are many problems that arise with juvenile inmates who participate in
biomedical and behavioral research that are not addressed by the federal regulations.
One important issue that relates to juvenile inmates seeking remedies for any injury
caused by research is the statute of limitations.173 This issue arises when side effects
due to the research show up years after the actual experiment.174 These side effects
are the injury resulting from the participation in the research while in prison.175 By
the time the side effects are known by the former juvenile inmate, possibly now an
adult, the statute of limitations may have run, which bars any claims the injured
might otherwise be able to bring.176 What is referred to as the discovery rule is often
the determining factor in these cases.177 Under the discovery rule, once the injured
person discovers the injury the statute of limitations starts to run, but diligence must
be used in discovering the critical facts of the injury.178
One prime example of this scenario is Bibeau v. Pacific Northwest Research
Foundation, Inc.179 In this case a former inmate, while incarcerated, participated in a
research experiment that tested the effects of radiation on human testicular

169

Id.

170

Id. See also 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.408(a), 46.405 (1999).

171

Feinstein, supra note 167, at 191.

172

Thomas D. Eppright, et al., Comorbidity of Conduct Disorder and Personality
Disorders in an Incarcerated Juvenile Population, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1233, 1235 (1993).
173

See generally Bibeau, 188 F.3d 1105.

174

Id. at 1106.

175

Id.

176

Id.

177

Id. at 1107.

178

Bibeau, 188 F.3d at 1108.

179

Id.

96

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 15:77

function.180 Side effects from the experiment had developed some twenty years later
causing pain to the former inmate.181 However, all of the former prisoner’s claims
were barred by the statute of limitations.182 The plaintiff in this case had experienced
various symptoms and ailments through his life such as severe testicular pain and
periodic groin rash, which he had considered “common male complaints.”183 The
plaintiff never consulted a doctor, nor did he ever think that the various symptoms
were directly related to the experiment that had taken place years ago.184 The court
held, according to these facts, that the plaintiff had not acted diligently in discovering
the injury.185 This type of problem is more likely to occur with juveniles since they
might not become aware of any injury until years later, when it might become
comprehensible to them.
Another problem for juvenile inmates is that there are inadequate protections
available for them as a group under the federal regulations. Remember that there are
two separate additional sets of regulations for both prisoners and children created by
the DHHS.186 In order for both of these regulatory provisions to apply to juvenile
inmates, this class of persons must meet both the definitions given for “children” and
“prisoner.”187 A combining of the definitions allows only individuals “involuntarily
confined or detained in a penal institution”188 and “who have not attained the legal
age for consent to treatments or procedures involved in the research, under the
applicable law of the jurisdiction”189 where conducted to be covered by both
regulations.
There are many discrepancies that arise when the two sets of additional
protection regulations are applied to juvenile inmates. Recall that one protection for
prisoners is that a prisoner is required to be a member of the IRB to give adequate
representation of prisoners’ interests.190 If this requirement is fulfilled in the juvenile
prisoner setting, then the prisoners’ interests could not possibly be adequately
represented. A child, who cannot even give “legal consent” by definition, cannot
give reasonable input on the decisions made by the IRB on approving or
disapproving of the research protocol.191
Both additional protection regulations apply a “minimal risk” standard, which
compares that risk to the “physical or psychological harm that is normally
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encountered in the daily lives.”192 Again, this is an ambiguous standard, which does
nothing but harm the rights of juvenile inmates. It is ambiguous as to whether
“minimal risk” is to be measured by the risks encountered in the daily life of an
average, everyday person, or whether it is to be measured by the risks encountered
by the actual subjects who are participating in the research, here being juvenile
prisoners.193 The fact that juvenile prisoners engage in more dangerous activities and
live in harsh social conditions, creating higher risk situations in their daily lives,
could broaden the definition of “minimal risk.”194 If this definition becomes too
broad, then many types of research that might have been rejected by a strict standard,
as was intended by the regulations, would be permitted.
The two sets of regulations also conflict in other ways. There is a special
provision in Subpart D of title 45, part 46, which provides the additional protections
for research on children, that covers children who are wards of the state.195 Research
can only be conducted upon wards of the state when related to their status as wards
and when the majority of other children involved in the same research experiment
are not wards.196 The second of these two requirements conflicts directly with the
additional protections placed on prisoners. Under 45 C.F.R. § 46.305(a) the fourth
consideration to be made by the IRB in deciding whether to approve the research
protocol is that the prisoner subjects be selected equally and randomly.197 Since there
may be participants who are wards, a strong possibility in juvenile institutions,
researchers cannot select possible participants randomly, when at the same time they
are required to give careful consideration in making sure that there is a majority of
prisoners who are not wards of the state. Juvenile prisoners cannot be selected
randomly if care must be taken to make sure that there is a majority of prisoners who
are not wards of the state and actually have parents or guardians to consent for them.
It may also be very difficult to choose subjects among juvenile prisoners equally
when certain children must assent to the research, while others are not required to
give such assent.198
Another conflict between the two sets of regulatory protections revolves around
the issue of informed consent. The additional protections for prisoners require, in the
fifth consideration made by the IRB, that information be provided to the subject
population in a way that is understandable to the subjects.199 This poses a problem
when dealing with juvenile inmates who, due to their maturity level, may have a hard
time understanding and comprehending certain information. While strictly adhering
to this requirement could prevent all research on juvenile inmates, several states that
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carry “mature minor” laws may still permit research on these juveniles.200 These laws
allow children to give informed consent to medical treatment when they have
attained such early ages as fourteen or fifteen.201 Sometimes these “mature minor”
laws permit a child, who can exhibit a competency to understand the research and its
procedures, to be the deciding factor of legal age to give informed consent, rather
than allowing consent dependent on the age of the minor.202 In a study conducted on
researchers, three-fourths of all of the researchers “said they would use their clinical
judgment to evaluate whether the child had sufficient maturity to assent.”203 Given a
researcher’s self-interest, this is too much discretion in his/her hands.
One argument against the researcher having so much discretion is that
researchers have a fiduciary duty to their subjects.204 The law of fiduciary duty is
meant to protect individuals with less expertise, here the subjects, from the abuse of
power given or delegated to the fiduciary, here the researcher or investigator.205
Although this is a concept borrowed from the field of medical treatment, it may also
be applied to biomedical and behavioral research, since subjects often depend on the
researcher’s knowledge and expertise as patients depend on their physicians to assist
them in making medical decisions.206 Researchers are associated with a class of
individuals with superior knowledge similar to other professionals who have
fiduciary duties.207 One important fiduciary duty is to prevent any unnecessary
inducement or coercion to persuade the subject to participate in the research.
Coercion is a much more difficult problem among juvenile inmates than any
other class or group of individuals who participate in biomedical and behavioral
research. The same modes of coercion or influence that may be tolerated in research
on adult prisoners would be very problematic in the experimentation on juvenile
prisoners.208 The inducement needed to obtain consent in a vulnerable class of
individuals is easier than that required for obtaining consent from average
individuals.209 The more disadvantaged a class of individuals is, the less inducement
or coercive external force is needed.210 The combination of prison life and maturity
level of children, often with behavioral problems, makes for a very disadvantaged
population.
The same coercive tools can be used on juvenile inmates to induce them to
participate in research, as on adult prisoners. However, coercive tools can have a
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more extreme effect on juveniles who are incarcerated. Again, money paid to the
prisoners is the most common inducement.211 One argument used often to address
this problem is to offer the prisoners the same rate of pay as would be received for
any other prisoner job or work activity.212 There are two deficiencies that make this
suggestion flawed in its application. The first, is that the more the pay rate is
lowered, the more attractive the group becomes for experimentation to researchers
because the research then becomes much cheaper to conduct.213 This in turn would
increase the amount of research ultimately conducted on juvenile inmates. The
second flaw to this suggestion, is that even though juvenile prisoners will be paid the
same rate that they would have received through other prison jobs, they are being
paid for easier work. Prison jobs often are accompanied by hard labor; therefore,
juvenile inmates might want to give up their jobs for easier activities by participating
in a research experiment. However, one federal district court has held that where an
adult prisoner is presented with other opportunities to make money besides
participation in a research experiment, there is no coercion on the part of the
researcher.214
Situational coercion also plays a large role in the problems facing biomedical and
behavioral research on juvenile inmates. According to psychology principals,
“myriad life situations” cause coercion in and of themselves without any external
force.215 Based on this principle, all aspects that make up a juvenile prisoner’s daily
life already have a coercive nature to them, before any inducement comes from
researchers. One example of situational coercion in a juvenile prisoner’s life might
be that the prisoner currently shares a cell with a violent cellmate; that individual is
already coerced into doing anything that may give him a single cell or the chance to
move to another location.216 Other situational coercion might include unsanitary
living conditions, inadequate heat or hot water, overcrowding and excess noise
within the prison, which may cause anxiety or fear.217 All of these types of
conditions are examples of situational coercion affecting the juvenile prisoner’s right
to choose to participate in research voluntarily. Even the court in Bailey, which
found no coercion in that case, acknowledged that “where there are no opportunities
for productive activity, research projects might offer relief from boredom.”218
Coercion is at the core of the constitutional arguments that would be made by
juvenile prisoners. Unfortunately, these arguments have not been successful in the
courts. It has been held that constitutional remedies will not be granted if the
subjects are granted the ability to withdraw from the experiment at any time during
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such experiment.219 This is a major problem when the informed consent provisions of
45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a) require that every consent form contain a statement informing
subjects that they may discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss
of benefits.220 Even where there is coercion from the outset, if there is “proper”
informed consent, containing a provision that allows for withdrawal from the
experiment at any time, then all constitutional claims will be barred. There appears
to be an inherent penalty that subjects must face. As long as that statement is
required to be a part of informed consent by 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a), the subjects are
barred from bringing any constitutional claims for any violations of rights based on
coercion as the courts suggest.221 If this dilemma can be overcome, then the best
argument for juvenile prisoners to make is a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s
cruel and unusual punishment clause.
Even if the Eighth Amendment argument is reached, it is also very hard to win,
especially for a juvenile prisoner who is a subject in a research experiment. Few
cases have heard Eighth Amendment claims brought by prisoners who have
participated in research experiments, but the ones that have have dismissed the
claims.222 The courts have held that in order to show cruel and unusual punishment,
the thing or injury that had occurred must be “shocking to the conscience” of
mankind.223 The “cumulative impact of several prison conditions” can amount to
cruel and unusual punishment, but even then, the combination of those conditions
must still be shocking to the conscience of mankind.224 There have been other
standards applied in Eighth Amendment cases involving prisoners who are not
research participants. One, which may be borrowed for purposes of research cases,
is that prison officials have a duty to provide humane conditions and to take
reasonable measures to guarantee the prisoners’ safety.225 It has also been held that,
according to the Eighth Amendment, there must not be any “serious deprivation of
basic human needs.”226 Another common standard is that treatment that is
“incompatible with ‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society’” violates the Eighth Amendment.227 However, no case has actually
been heard where juvenile prisoners brought an action for violation of the Eighth
Amendment. There is one case, from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, that held
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that “tinkering with [one’s] mental processes” as some research does might raise
serious constitutional questions as to cruel and unusual punishment.228
Another major problem with bringing claims of injury resulting from
participation in research experiments is that even if the claims are successful, the
named defendants in the cases are often excused by what is termed “qualified
immunity.”229 Qualified immunity applies to most researchers who either are public
officials or who contract with the government to carry out the research.230 The
defense was created to balance public policy concerns between protecting
individuals’ constitutional rights and defending public officials from suits brought
against them for every error, thereby diverting them from their public duties.231 If a
defendant did not know or should not have reasonably known that his/her action
would violate the constitutional rights of the plaintiff, or did not take action with
“malicious intention to cause deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to
plaintiff,” then the qualified immunity defense will be granted to the defendant.232
Qualified immunity has been used, in many cases, to excuse defendants for their
violations of the subjects’ individual rights.233 No case has yet been brought in the
federal courts involving juvenile inmates, but the same defense of qualified
immunity could apply. Bailey held that the preference of society not to research on
the socially or economically underprivileged (e.g. prisoners) “does not add up to a
presently established constitutional absolute.”234
Juvenile prisoners who have been injured may also bring suit under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (hereinafter “FTCA”).235 Unfortunately, prisoners who have brought
claims of injury under this tort theory have had their claims dismissed.236 The FTCA
requires that plaintiffs exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing an
action in the courts.237 However, in two of these cases the plaintiff prisoners
attempted to bring an action in the administrative agency before commencing suit in
court, and were rejected by the administrative agency which the plaintiffs
contacted.238 The court in both cases still held that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust
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their administrative remedies.239 In one of the cases, the plaintiff merely wrote a
letter to the FDA asking for damages for the injury caused by the experiment, which
the court held was not sufficient for exhausting his administrative remedies.240 In the
other case, the plaintiff did file an administrative claim with the DHHS, but the claim
was denied in a letter to the plaintiff, notifying him that he had six months to file an
FTCA suit in court.241 The plaintiff did not meet that demand, and therefore, the
court barred his claim for failing to meet the requirements of the administrative
procedure.242 With these strict guidelines, juvenile inmates, who may not be able to
afford or obtain legal assistance, will be unable to succeed on FTCA claims.
This leads to another major problem with juvenile inmates, which is that they
usually have no legal representation and often fail to recognize when legal
representation is needed.243 Juvenile prisoners can hardly seek to recover under any
of the possible claims when they cannot receive legal advice. One suggestion is that
the researchers and institutions that seek to conduct experiments on this particularly
vulnerable population provide legal representation for the individual subjects.244
However, this presents a conflict of interest where the attorney would be hired by the
researcher, yet at the same time represent the inmate. Again, there is a risk that the
juveniles will not be able to comprehend what it is that the attorney is advising.
Finally, 45 C.F.R. § 46.124 permits implementing additional protections for
juvenile inmates.245 That section provides that “with respect to any research
project…the department or agency head may impose additional conditions prior to or
at the time of approval when…necessary for the protection of human subjects.”246
This provision should be used frequently when considering research subjects who are
juvenile inmates.
VII. CONCLUSION
The current regulations are not enough to protect juvenile inmates from coercive
“choices,” caused by the nature of prison and incentives used by researchers.
However, as stated by J. Thomas Puglisi, Director of the Division of Human Subject
Protections under the DHHS, during congressional testimony, “We are always
interested in improving the system to make research as safe as it can possibly be.”247
The system needs improvement in various ways to remedy the flaws that have been
discussed. One of two things must occur to remedy these flaws.
Either there must be additional protections passed by the DHHS addressing the
specific issues of juvenile inmates, or there should be a total prohibition against
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research on juvenile prisoners. If additional protections are created, they should set a
cutoff age by which only the oldest juvenile inmates may participate in research
experiments. Such age provisions might limit participation at age fourteen or fifteen,
and any person below those ages would be prohibited from research experiments.
For those individuals who are ages fourteen or fifteen and above, participation in any
research experiment should depend on their ability to pass an informed consent test,
which would assess the individual’s ability to understand the ramifications of any
such experiment. This informed consent test should be reviewed by the IRB before
being administered to the individual. In order for the total prohibition to be
implemented, the subject would have to meet both the definitions of a child and a
prisoner according to the federal regulations. Research is still being conducted on
juvenile inmates, as evidenced by the 1997 Stanford University study on sixty-one
juvenile inmates, and will continue to be conducted in the future so long as it is
possible for researchers to do so.248 Therefore, the need for these proposed changes is
immediate.
Researchers may be faced with the loss of a very beneficial research group if
research experimentation is prohibited, but there are alternative groups that are just
as beneficial.249 One example is the use of military programs such as Medical
Research Volunteer Subjects programs.250 These types of programs involve healthy
soldiers who are willing to participate in biomedical and behavioral research.251
These types of programs can supply researchers with a group of healthy, wellinformed, and uncoerced subjects who require little money to participate.252 There
are also other ways to conduct research on children who are not incarcerated to
experiment on the same types of behavioral problems.
The Nuremberg Code provides that subjects of research “should be so situated as
to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any element
of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or
coercion.”253 A population of juvenile prisoners is not so situated.
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